Propositions and Linguistic/Cognitive Action Conference (2017)
Venue: Manor House Schloss Mickeln, Heinrich-Heine-University Duesseldorf
Date: May 24th-May 26th
List of Speakers:
Professor Arianna Betti, Professor (Chair) of Philosophy of Language, University of Amsterdam. (Participating only)
Professor Richard Gaskin, Department of Philosophy, University of Liverpool.
Professor Peter Hanks, Department of Philosophy, University of Minnesota.
Professor Andrea Iacona, Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy and Educational Science, University of Turin.
Professor Robert Matthews, Proferssor of Philosophy, Center for Cognitive Science, Rutgers University.
Professor Dr. Friedericke Moltmann, Senior Researcher, Department of Philosophy, New York University.
Professor Dolf Rami, Associate Professor, Georg-August-University Gottingen.
Professor Dr. Francois Recanati, Research Fellow, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Institue Jean Nicod (Paris).
Samuel D. Taylor, Heinrich-Heine University Dusseldorf
Dr. Julia Zakkou (post-doctoral researcher), Philosophy, Hamburg University.
Conference Description:
Propositions are commonly taken to be one or many of the following: the primary bearers of truth-value; the objects of belief and other "propositional attitudes (i.e., what is believed, doubted, etc.); the referents of that-clauses; and the meanings of sentences (Gaskin, 2008; Iacona, 2002, 2003; Moltmann, 2003, 2013). As one or many of these conceptualisations, propositions play a central role in cognitive science, linguistics, and philosophy. However, at this point in time there is no widespread agreement about what sort of entities propositions are.
This ambiguity is particularly troubling in the case of those (sub-)disciplines where a commitment to propositions is fundamental. For example, in truth-conditional semantics it is assumed that the meaning of sentences - what sentences say or express - are truth-conditions, which are borne by propositions. And, in cognitive science, it is assumed that propositions function as the basic units of representation or schemata: the supposed building blocks of the mind. Therefore, in cases like these - and in many others like them (cf. Betti, 2015) - the lack of clarity about just what kinds of things propositions are threatens to undermine the research paradigm at its foundations
In this conference, we will consider a new approach to the study of the nature of propositions and propositional content: the approach that takes propositions to be types of cognitive or spoken actions (Hanks, 2015; King, 2013; King, Soames, and Speaks, 2015; Soames, 2010, forthcoming) or products of such acts (Moltmann 2014, forthcoming a, b). According to this view, propositions are either types of events of cognitive predications or act types performed by speakers in uttering sentences (Soames, 2010, 2012; Hanks, 2015). In either case, representational and truth-conditional entities are taken to originate through our mental and spoken actions, and the role of propositions – as entities of this kind – is to classify and individuate these actions. In this way, propositions are viewed as types of token cognitive or spoken actions, which inherit their type truth-conditional or representational nature from the mental and spoken actions that are their tokens.
This new approach promises to provide an answer to the question of what sorts of things propositions are. But still a number of issues remain unclear. In regards to the approach itself, one could ask, for instance: Where does this approach stand in relation to the traditional distinction between conceptualism and traditional Platonic realism about propositions?; can propositions inherit truth-conditions or representational natures in worlds in which they are not tokened by mental and spoken actions?; if propositions inherit their truth-conditionality and representational nature from token mental and spoken actions, does this commit us to a particular conception of (i) truth (say, coherentist) and (ii) representation?; and many more.
More specifically, this new approach bring forward a number of questions related to those (sub-)disciplines in which a commitment to one or many conceptualisations of propositions is central. For example, if propositions as truth-conditional contents are act types performed by speakers in uttering sentences, then it is interesting to consider what impact would this have on debates about literal meaning, contextualism, and semantic minimalism in truth-conditional semantics (Recanati, 2004; Capellen and Lepore, 2004)? And, if propositions as representational entities are types of events of cognitive predications, then what would this imply for debates about the representational nature of cognition (Chater & Christiansen, 2010; Clark, 2013; Floridi, 2011)?
The aim of this conference is to bring together researchers from a range of (sub-)disciplines to consider questions of these kinds. On the one hand, then, the conference aims to examine and compare this new conception of propositions with its more entrenched counterparts: Platonic realism and conceptualism. But, on the other hand, this conference aims to consider how – if at all – this new conception of propositions can be put to work to resolve, move forward, or undermine debates in (sub-)disciplines that rely heavily on a working conception of propositions. It is hoped, therefore, that ultimately by focusing on this new, controversial cognitive/linguistic-action conception of propositions, the assumptions and commitments of the research paradigms of (sub-)disciplines can be identified and evaluated as a means to identify the potential stumbling blocks to both disciplinary and interdisciplinary progress.
Bibliography:
Betti, A. 2015. Against Facts. MIT Press.
Capellen, H. & Lepore, E. 2004. Insensitive Semantics: A Defense of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism. Wiley-Blackwell.
Chater, N. & Christiansen, M. 2010. Language Acquisition Meets Language Evolution. Cognitive Science, 34: 1131-1157.
Clark, A. 2013. Whatever Next? Predictive Brains, Situated Agents, and the Future of Cognitive Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36(3): 1–73.
Floridi, L. 2011. The Philosophy of Information. Oxford University Press.
Gaskin, W. 2008. The Unity of the Proposition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hanks, P. 2015. Propositional Content. Oxford. Oxford University Press.
Iacona, A. 2002. Propositions, Genoa, Italy: Name.
– 2003. Are There Propositions?, Erkenntnis, 58: 325–351.
King, J. 2013. Propositional Unity: What’s the Problem, Who Has it and Who Solves it? Philosophical Studies, 165: 71–93.
King, J., Soames, S. and Speaks, J. 2014. New Thinking About Propositions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Moltmann, F. 2003. Propositional Attitudes without Propositions. Synthese, 135: 77–118.
– 2013. Abstract Objects and the Semantics of Natural Language. Oxford University Press.
– 2014. Propositions, Attitudinal Objects, and the Distinction between Action and Products. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 43: 5-6, special issue 'Propositions and their Grasp or Understanding', edited by D. Hunter and G. Rattan, 2014, pp. 679-701.
– forthcoming a: Cognitive Products and the Semantics of Attitude Verbs and Deontic Modals. To appear in F. Moltmann / M. Textor (eds.): Act-Based Conceptions of Propositional Content. Contemporary and Historical Perspectives. Oxford University Press, New York, 2017
– forthcoming b: Levels of Linguistic Acts and the Semantics of Saying and Quoting. To appear in S. L. Tsohatzidis (ed.): Interpreting Austin: Critical Essays. Cambridge University Press.
Recanati, F. 2004. Literal Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Soames, S. 2010. What is Meaning? Princeton: Princeton University Press.
– 2012. Propositions. In Fara and Russell, 2012: 209–20.
– forthcoming. Rethinking Language, Mind, and Meaning. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Program:
Program and Time Schedule (Example):
DAY 1:
12:30-14:00 | Registration and Lunch |
14:00-14:30 | Welcome |
14:30-15:30 | Talk I Demonstratives: Cognitive vs. Literal Content |
15:30-15:45 | Coffee break |
15:45 -16:45 | Talk II Julia Zakkou Motivations for Relativistic Propositions |
16:45-17:00 | Coffee break |
17:00-18:00 | Talk III Sentences as Predicates of Modal and Attitudinal Objects |
Evening | Dinner |
DAY 2:
10:00-10:45 | Breakfast and Coffee |
10:45-11.45 | Talk IV Peter Hanks The Classificatory Conception of Propositional Content |
11:45-12:00 | Coffee break |
12:00-13:00 | Group Discussion Session TBA |
13:00-14:15 | Lunch break |
14:15-15:15 | Talk V Force Cancellation |
15:15-15:30 | Coffee break |
15:30-16:30 | Talk VI Samuel D. Taylor The Representational Action Approach to Semantics: From Utterance to Content |
18:30 | Dinner |
DAY 3:
08:30-09:55 | Breakfast and Coffee |
09:55-10:55 | Talk VII Richard Gaskin Reference, Singular Propositions, and Linguistic Idealism |
11:00-12:00 | Talk VIII Propositions and Logical Form |
12:00-12:15 | Coffee break |
12:15-13:15 | Talk IV Robert Mathews Propositions, Belief Predication, and Belief |
13:15-13:45 | Final Discussion Session |
14:45-15:00 | Goodbye |
Titles and Abstracts:
Richard Gaskin
Title: Reference, Singular Propositions, and Linguistic Idealism
Abstract:
The paper starts by arguing that reference should be regarded as a way of modelling linguistic understanding. The referents of declarative sentences are argued to be Russellian propositions, and the idea of singular such propositions outlined and defended against recent objections. I also look at general aspects of the recommended theoretical approach to reference, comparing it with the neo-Fregean syntactic priority thesis, and showing that it yields a kind of linguistic idealism, according to which the world is actually composed of true and false propositions.
Peter Hanks
Title: The Classificatory Conception of Propositional Content
Abstract:
According to the classificatory conception, propositions are devices we use for classifying and individuating our mental states and utterances. This conception stands in contrast to a Fregean conception, on which propositions are the primary bearers of representation and truth-conditions, and a Russellian conception, on which propositions are what we represent with our attitudes and speed acts. After contrasting these three views I will explore some of the consequences of the classificatory account for our understanding of the relationship between language, thought, and perceptual experience.
Andrea Iacona
Title: Propositions and Logical Form
Abstract:
This paper investigates the thought that logical form is essentially a property of propositions. First it presents a notion of logical form - the truth conditional notion - according to which logical form is determined by truth conditions. Then it compares three theories of propositions which can substantiate in different ways the understanding of truth conditions that underlies that notion: the naturalized propositions theory advocated by King, the truthmaker theory advocated by Fine, and the action type theory advocated by Soames and Hanks. As will be argued, there is at least one significant respect in which the first and the second theory suit the truth conditional notion better than the third.
Robert Mathews
Title: Propositions, Belief Predication, and Belief
Abstract:
In my talk I will address two questions: (i) What role, if any, do propositions play in an account of belief predication, and (ii) What role, if any, do propositions play in an account of belief itself? I argue that depending on how the that-clauses of belief predicates are construed, propositions may well have a role in belief predication, but no obvious role in an account of belief, at least not as a constituent of belief.
Friederike Moltmann
Title: Sentences as Predicates of Modal and Attitudinal Objects
Abstract:
In this talk I will outline a novel account of sentence meaning according to which sentences act as predicates of modal or attitudinal objects, entities like claims, judgements, intentions, desires, requessts, permissions, obligations, and needs. I will argue that this view overcomes a range of problems for the standard view of propositions as well as the recent act-based conceptions of Hanks and Soames
Dolf Rami
Title: Demonstratives: Cognitive vs. Literal Content
Abstract:
The first part of my talk is concerned with a specific kind of mental judgements, namely demonstratives or attentive mental judgements. I will argue for the view that these mental acts are parasitic or dependent acts that depend on certain preceding acts of representation, which make use of certain mental representations (conceived of as stores of information) of objects and properties. These mental acts of representation can be simple or complex. In the complex case, we have acts that co-represent a single object or property by means of different mental stores of information. In the second part, I will propose a new semantics of demonstrative expressions. I will distinguish two sorts of Non-Fregean modes of presentation. Internal mental modes of presentation and external inter-subjective modes of presentation. The semantic referent of demonstrative pronouns generically depends on referential intentions, which are parasitic on specific mental acts of representation. However, in the case of communicative uses of demonstrative pronouns external modes of presentation can trump the internal modes and ultimately determine the referents in a purely external way. Furthermore, I will argue that the meaningful use of demonstrative expressions neither individually nor generically depends on demonstrative/attentive mental acts of judgements, but only on specific acts of representation.
Francois Recanati
Title: Force Cancellation
Abstract:
Peter Hanks and Scott Soames both defend pragmatic solutions to the problem of the unity of the proposition. According to them, what ties together Tim and baldness in the singular proposition expressed by 'Tim is bald' is an acto of the speaker (or thinker): the act of predicating baldness of Tim. But Soames construes that act as force neutral and noncommittal while, for Hanks, it is inherently assertive and committal. Hanks answers the Frege-Geach challenge by arguing that, in complex sentences, the force inherent in the content of an embedded sentence is cancelled. As several philosophers noticed, Hanks's proposal faces a dilemma: either force cancellation dissolves the unity of the proposition secured by the cacelled act of assertion (and Hanks's proposal does not work), or Hanks's proposal reduces to Soames's. In this talk, I respond to the objection by offering an analysis of force cancellation which gets rid of the alleged dilemma. The proposal is based on a set of distinctions from speech act theory: between two senses of 'force', two types of act, and two types of context.
Samuel D. Taylor
Title: The Representational Approach to Semantics: From Utterance to Content
Abstract:
In this paper, I begin from the question: what are utterances? I first criticise the view that utterances are token intentional action events in a context, and I develop an alternative: utterances as representational acts of predication. This alternative allows for me to argue for a language of utterance hypothesis (LOUH), which takes utterances and sentences to be indistinguishable when defined in terms of syntactic operations over representations. Then, by integrating my account of utterances with the representational action approach to propositions (Hanks, 2015), I argue for a reconceptualisation of what is said as the type classified and individuated utterance (/sentence) of a speaker, and I introduce what is understood as the type classified and individuated utterance (/sentence) of a hearer. This leads to an account of communicated content – what is communicated – as the overlap between what is said and what is understood. I call this account the representational action approach to semantics and use it to illustrate how a distinction between communicated and semantic content is necessary even though both are unified from the ground up.
Julia Zakkou
Title: Motivations for Relativistic Propositions
Abstract:
Accounting for perspectival language has been a challenge for philosophers of language and linguistics ever since. Anout 15 years ago, a new generation of reletivists appeared on the scene. They argued that only relativistic propositions could account for a number of striking linguistic phenomena featuring perspectival language and that, therefore, standard semantic approaches such as objectivism and contextualism would have to be rejected. In recent years though, proponents of non-relativistic propositions have formed resistance. They hold that many of the proclaimed linguistic phenomena are simply not real and there is thus no need for relativistic propostions. In this talk, I shall defend relativism against the most recent of these attacks. I shall argue that retraction---the withdrawal of previous utterances---is a real phenomenon that semanticists should take seriously.