



**Der Sonderforschungsbereich 991 "Die Struktur von Repräsentationen in Sprache, Kognition und Wissenschaft" lädt herzlich ein zum Vortrag  
von**

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12:30 – 14:00 Uhr

22.01.2C

## ***Causation and (a)telicity in a force-theoretic framework***

This talk reflects joint work with Heidi Harley (University of Arizona). In syntactic representations of standard neo-Davidsonian semantics (e.g. Ramchand 2008), a causal relation is used only to represent causes which temporally precede their effects. However, causes do not always precede their effects in time; very often they occur at (more or less) the same time as their effects. This fact has often been modeled in force-dynamic representations of verb meanings (Talmy 1988, Gärdenfors 2014, e.g.) but very little in formal approaches; van Lambalgen & Hamm (2005) is an exception, however the type theory embedded in their framework is linguistically implausible.

We take the formal analogue of the notion of force to be a function from situations to the *ceteris paribus* result of the force's application—i.e., the result that occurs if no forces arising outside of the initial situation intervene. Working at the syntax-semantics interface, we model telicity as occurring when the result situation begins after the force's application, and atelicity as occurring when the result situation begins as the force's application begins. This account thereby provides a conceptual as well as a syntactic scaffolding for formal properties of telic vs. atelic predicates noticed elsewhere (Krifka 1998, Filip 2008, among many others).

**Studierende und andere Interessierte sind herzlich willkommen.**