

What is given in emotion  
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In this paper I am concerned with the content of conscious emotion. I start from the position that the content of an experience is (absolutely) everything that is given to one, experientially, in the having of the experience, everything one is aware of, experientially, in the having of the experience. I argue that an essential part of what is given in conscious emotion is what I will call ‘emotion-value properties’. In explicating what is involved in emotions’ attribution of emotion-value properties to objects and states of affairs, I consider the following five claims. [1] The properties of being sad, being joyous, being disgusting and so on are experienced as objective properties of objects and states of affairs. [2] The property attributions of being sad, being joyous, and being disgusting are essentially *value* property attributions, hence the name ‘emotion-value properties’. [3] In addition to whatever cognitive-phenomenological and sensory-phenomenological properties emotional episodes may have, they necessarily have a distinctive *sui generis* kind of phenomenology, which I call ‘evaluative phenomenology’. [4] Emotions provide—constitute—a distinctive evaluative awareness of the world. [5] It is partly in virtue of an emotion’s evaluative phenomenology that value properties are attributed to objects and states of affairs in the having of an emotion.