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# Emotion Concepts in Use - An Interdisciplinary Workshop by the Collaborative Research Centre 991



June 25 - 26, 2015

Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf

O.A.S.E. - Building 16.61, Floor 1 - Forum des Austauschs



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# DFG Collaborative Research Centre 991: The Structure of Representations in Language, Cognition, and Science

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## Summary

How do we conceive of the world? What is the structure and composition of our concepts? How do we represent in our minds categories, individuals, relations, properties, events, or sentence meanings? The CRC 991 is a foundational research centre that addresses issues of a general theory of conceptual representation such as these. A research focus in linguistics is combined with projects from philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, and the philosophy of science. The point of departure is the hypothesis that there is a uniform structure of representations at the neural level, the level of linguistic concepts, and the level of institutionalized conceptions such as those used in science. This uniform structure is frames in the sense introduced by the cognitive psychologist Lawrence Barsalou. Barsalou frames describe what they represent in terms of attributes (for example shape, origin, or function) and the values they take. According to Barsalou's theory of cognition, frames are grounded in, and interact with, the sensory-motor system. The human system of concepts is not abstract and amodal; rather it is immediately anchored with perception and action.

The central and overarching objective of the CRC is the development of a general frame theory of concepts. The foundations of such a theory were laid in the DFG Research Unit 600 "Functional Concepts and Frames", where the notoriously vague notion of "frame" received a precise formal definition. The CRC aims at extending this theory by two fundamental innovations that go considerably beyond Barsalou's original approach: the modeling of dynamic concept components such as temporal developments and causal relationships, and an investigation of the general operations for modifying, deriving, and combining concepts. In the linguistic projects, the approach will be adopted to develop for the first time a principled general theory for decomposing word meanings. This will be the basis for a new theoretical understanding of the grammatical and semantic combination of words into sentences. With this approach, the CRC aims at building a bridge between the formal and the cognitive camps in linguistics. In addition to linguistics, frame theory will be applied in interdisciplinary projects to the analysis of paradigm shifts in the natural sciences, to the analysis of German criminal law terms, and to the classification of psychiatric disorders. Psycholinguistic and neuro-cognitive projects empirically test the predictions of the frame approach with respect to language processing and the grounding of linguistic concepts in the sensory-motor system.

# Workshop: Emotion Concepts in Use

A Joint Project by:

## **Dr. Liane Ströbel**

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## Time and Location

June 25 - 26 , 2015, Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Germany, O.A.S.E.

## Aims and Scope

This workshop aims at analyzing emotion concepts from an interdisciplinary perspective (e.g., linguistics, philosophy, psychology). On the one hand, the workshop is interested in the cognitive mechanisms underlying the experience of emotions and emotion concepts, and, on the other hand, it is interested in the (frame-theoretical) modeling and prediction of the ways in which emotion expressions are used.

A core feature of human mental life is not only the experience of emotion but also the application of emotion concepts to the outer world. We do not only know what it is like to be surprised, but we also describe a situation or an event as surprising or even call something a surprise. On the contrary, we might consider a situation to be sad, but we would not label it by the word sadness (in English, at least).

Moreover, it is not only the case that we apply emotion concepts such as SAD and JOYFUL to inanimate subjects as music, art and literature (e.g., this song is so sad, this melody is so joyful, this story has a happy ending), but we also use emotion concepts to intensify our emotions when we speak, for example, about panic-stricken fear.



# People

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## Invited Speakers

**Margaret Freeman**

Myrfield Institute for Cognition and the Arts

**Michelle Montague**

The University of Texas at Austin, Philosophy

**Zoltan Kövecses**

Eötvös Loránd University, American Studies

**John Lambie**

Angelia Ruskin University, Psychology

**Sebastian Löbner**

Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, CRC 991

**Liane Ströbel**

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# Program

Time	Thursday, June 25
9.00	registration
9.15	welcome
9.35	<b>Margaret Freeman</b> Literary Emotion in Aesthetic Judgement
10.35	<i>coffee break</i>
10.55	<b>Richard Dub</b> Emotion-For and Goal Simulation
11.35	<b>Michelle Montague</b> What is given in emotion?
12.35	<i>lunch break</i>
13.45	<b>Phil Hutchinson</b> Emotion, Placebo and World-Taking Cognitivism: Overcoming Propositionality and Mechanistic Explanation
14.25	<b>Wilhelm Geuder</b> Emotions and “the affective realm”
15.05	<i>coffee break</i>
15.25	<b>John Lambie</b> How the world is experienced in emotion: Theories and Implications of world-focused emotion experience.
16.25	<i>ten-minute-break</i>
16.35	<b>Alex Tillas</b> The role of emotions in reasoning & decision-making
17.15	<b>Claudia Turolla</b> The pragmatic meaning of Italian evaluative morphology: how encoded emotions support the recovery of linguistic abilities in aphasic subjects.
19.30	<i>conference dinner</i>

Time	Friday, June 26
9.35	<b>Sebastian Löbner</b> What we talk about when we talk about emotions
10.35	<i>coffee break</i>
10.55	<b>Rick Nouwen</b> Degree semantics and emotion
11.35	<b>Nina Fronhofer</b> “So angry” or rather “schon leicht wütend”? - A study of language-specific emotion patterns in English and German
12.15	<i>lunch break</i>
13.25	<b>Roxana Ciolaneanu, Alina Villalva, Esperança Carneira</b> ANGER IS RED and FEAR IS WHITE: universal conceptual metaphors
14.05	<b>Liane Ströbel</b> How to describe the indescribable: Charlie Hebdo & Germanwings
15.05	<i>coffee break</i>
15.25	<b>Zoltan Kövecses</b> Two ways of studying emotion metaphors in cognitive linguistics
16.25	closing

# Abstracts

## Literary Emotion in Aesthetic Judgment

Margaret H. Freeman (Myrifiel Institute for Cognition and the Arts)

What makes art special are the cognitive processes that put us iconically in touch with our emotional and sensuous experiences as participants of the world we share. Aesthetic evaluation enables us to determine the extent to which a given work of art successfully simulates those experiences in being iconic of reality. Aesthetics may thus be understood both in its philosophical sense of exploring the conditions of our sensuous and emotional experiences and in its artistic sense of appreciating the nature of art in all its forms.

The emotional and sensory effects of a poem lie not so much in the poem's meanings per se, but in its prosody: the combination of its rhythms, its images, the metalinguistic features of pattern and repetition, the inflections of the spoken voice, that are only partially represented by word choice and order and punctuation. Paying attention to interpreting a poem without experiencing its prosody can lead to missing its emotional effect and thus result in a misreading of the poet's intent, understood, not in the sense of communicative intention, but rather in the sense of intensity of attention or intent observation.

Failure to perceive a poem's emotional tone results in critical misreadings and misevaluations. Perceptive understanding and appreciation of literary emotion is thus a necessary prerequisite for aesthetic judgment.

## Emotion-For and Goal Simulation

Richard Dub (University of Geneva)

Some emotions can be experienced on another's behalf. We can feel fear for a child playing near traffic, or we can feel embarrassment for a man who is giving a speech while he has spaghetti sauce on his shirt. Other emotions do not easily admit of 'emotion for' constructions. Can I love my daughter for another person, or feel guilt for a criminal, or feel envy on behalf of my friend who was passed up for a job? What distinguishes emotions that afford 'emotion for' constructions from those that do not? In the first part of the talk, I present three readings of 'emotion for' locutions. They can be used to express reasons for holding the emotion, or to express the content of the emotion, or to express the recipient of a vicarious emotion. The latter reading will be the one I focus on. In the second part of the talk, I distinguish vicarious emotions from empathetic emotions, and I offer a model of vicarious emotions using the resources of appraisal theory and simulation theory. Vicarious emotions are emotions generated by the simulation of goals within primary appraisal checks. Finally, in the third part of the talk, I discuss applications to which this model can be put, and I argue that the intentional structure of vicarious emotions helps explain why only some emotions can be vicariously experienced for another.

## What is given in emotion?

Michelle Montague (University of Texas at Austin)

In this paper I am concerned with the content of conscious emotion. I start from the position that the content of an experience is (absolutely) everything that is given to one, experientially, in the having of the experience, everything one is aware of, experientially, in the having of the experience. I argue that an essential part of what is given in conscious emotion is what I will call ‘emotion-value properties’. In explicating what is involved in emotions’ attribution of emotion-value properties to objects and states of affairs, I consider the following five claims. [1] The properties of being sad, being joyous, being disgusting and so on are experienced as objective properties of objects and states of affairs. [2] The property attributions of being sad, being joyous, and being disgusting are essentially value property attributions, hence the name ‘emotion-value properties’. [3] In addition to whatever cognitive-phenomenological and sensory-phenomenological properties emotional episodes may have, they necessarily have a distinctive sui generis kind of phenomenology, which I call ‘evaluative phenomenology’. [4] Emotions provide—constitute—a distinctive evaluative awareness of the world. [5] It is partly in virtue of an emotion’s evaluative phenomenology that value properties are attributed to objects and states of affairs in the having of an emotion.

## Emotion, Placebo and World-Taking Cognitivism: Overcoming Propositionality and Mechanistic Explanation

Phil Hutchinson (Manchester Metropolitan University)

1. Daniel Moerman (2002) and Fabrizio Benedetti (2014) have argued against prominent existing explanations for the placebo response that invoke (a.) conditioned response mechanisms or (b.) response expectancy, and instead propose the (c.) ‘meaning response’, suggesting we replace the term ‘placebo response’ with ‘meaning response’.
2. A number of authors in the philosophy of emotions, making reference to the dispute between (neo-)Jamesians and cognitivists (Judgementalists and Appraisal Theorists) have invoked what one might depict as a “dilemma of adequate explanation”, which emerges from the perceived inadequacies of both Jamesian and cognitivist accounts. For, as authors such as Deigh, Prinz, and Griffiths have argued, while cognitivism is strong on providing resources for explaining the meaningful content and intentionality of emotions, it seems weak on the trans-speciesality of many emotions: how some emotions can be common to humans and to some non-human animals. On the other hand, while Jamesianism is strong on the trans-speciesality of some emotions it is weak on meaning and intentionality. Employing arguments that run parallel to those of Moerman and Benedetti, I argue that the “dilemma of adequate explanation” arises only because of an

underlying commitment to propositionality. I propose a number of arguments that I suggest should lead one to abandon the commitment to propositionality in the philosophy of emotions. I then offer an alternative to propositionality. This alternative helps us avoid otherwise seemingly intractable problems in the philosophy of emotions, while respecting the data on the placebo (meaning) response and adding more philosophical detail to the proposals of Moerman and Benedetti.

### Emotions and “the affective realm“

Wilhelm Geuder (Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf)

In this talk, I want to investigate the extent to which „emotion“ can be singled out as a conceptual category that is relevant to linguistic semantics and can be semantically contrasted with other affective phenomena like moods, sentiments, etc. (for their classification I rely mostly on Ben Ze’ev 2000). I argue that distinctions in the German lexicon, which tend to group emotions with sentiments, as opposed to moods or affective traits, are triggered first and foremost by the relationality of a concept. In line with this, I present linguistic evidence supporting the view that the identification of an emotion is dependent only on the parameters of evaluation (but not e.g. on the surge of a feeling). In particular, I argue that the identity of „evaluations“ is the factor that decides on the countability of emotions, and that this factor also underlies the distinction between „stative“ and „punctual“ psych verbs that has been observed for Spanish by Marín & McNally (2011).

A crucial argument for the general claim as to the role of evaluations comes from the scope effect in the German sentences (a) Ich habe mich zweimal über seine seltsamen Wünsche geärgert [= 2 instances of anger corresponding to two different demands] vs. (b) (?) Ich habe mich über seine seltsamen Wünsche zweimal geärgert [= 2 instances of anger that require a difference in the parameters of evaluation of the same demands].

If time permits, I will also discuss how the identification of the object of evaluation in an emotion helps to distinguish true „emotion predicates“ in the lexicon from borderline cases that may refer to emotions only via a lexical shift (e.g. hope, love).

References: A. Ben Ze’ev (2000): *The Subtlety of Emotions*. MIT Press. – R. Marín & L. McNally (2011): „Inchoativity, change of state, and telicity: evidence from Spanish reflexive psychological verbs.“ *NLLT*, 29, 467–502)

## How the world is experienced in emotion: Theories and Implications of world-focused emotion experience.

John Lambie (Anglia Ruskin University)

This paper analyses the phenomenon of world-focused emotion experience, which has not had much recent attention from psychologists or philosophers. World-focused emotion experience is that aspect of emotion experience which is directed at the world rather than the self or body. For example, seeing a scary room, a disgusting spider, or an adorable baby. These are typically perceptual experiences and are not the same as either propositional thoughts or appraisals, although they may be the result of appraisals. This paper looks at the history of the characterization of such experiences from the Gestalt psychologists to the present day. Various characterizations of world-focused emotion experience are examined including: Ehrenfels qualities (Kohler), physiognomic character (Koffka), hodological space (Lewin), and gerundival perception (Lambie & Marcel). I will discuss the implications of world-focused emotion experience (and how it is characterized) for emotion theory and for emotion regulation.

## The role of emotions in reasoning & decision-making

Alex Tillas (Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf)

Traditionally, decision-making has been construed as a purely cognitive process. Recent psychological work has questioned views of this kind (cf. Litt et al. 2008), advancing a view of decision-making as the outcome of cognitive as well as affective processes (cf. Thagard and Aubie, 2008). Despite this progress though, the relation between cognitive and affective aspects of decision-making is underexplored, and the ways in which emotions inform decision-making and reasoning in general remain unclear. In this paper, I adopt a view according to which emotions are representational in character and are influenced by their connection weightings, and argue that emotions influence the relation at hand in both a 'negative' and a 'positive' manner. Regarding the positive manner, I appeal to Hebbian (1949) associationism and show that emotions enhance formation of associations between representations of attended features as well as concepts. Stronger associations between representations influence the activation pattern of the representational/conceptual network and in turn influence reasoning and decision-making. The negative manner in which emotions influence the relationship between cognitive and affective aspects of reasoning concerns the idiosyncratic characteristic of emotional states to dampen existing associations that ground reasoning, or even bypass them. Finally, emotions grant us the ability to recalibrate our representational system by voluntarily activating conceptualised versions of alternative emotional states – a further positive role. This results in minimisation of the warping effect of emotions in our representational and conceptual networks and in turn in reasoning and decision-making.

Keywords: Emotions; reasoning; decision-making; associations.



## **The pragmatic meaning of Italian evaluative morphology: how encoded emotions support the recovery of linguistic abilities in aphasic subjects.**

Claudia Turolla (University of Trento)

It has been widely demonstrated that diminutives have a pragmatic value and are often an expression of emotions. This is shown mostly in children who first acquire evaluative morphology with a pragmatic meaning, while its semantics appears later in a second step. In this work I explore this particular behavior in the field of Italian diminutive morphology, which is a powerful linguistic tool for emotion coding. I argue for the prevalence of a pragmatic/emotional core upon the semantic/dimensional level, using the following test: I asked a subject affected by transcortical motor aphasia, with serious deficit in inflectional and derivational morphology, to build diminutives answering two specific questions, corresponding to different production tasks: (a) „How would you say small X?“ and (b) „If you are addressing a baby or a beloved person, how would you say X?“. Inducing the differentiation between quantitative and qualitative meaning, I observed a significant variance among the performances in terms of ratio of correct answers between question (a) (23%) and question (b) (56%). These findings suggest that evaluative morphology makes use of cognitive processes, located in the right hemisphere of the brain, for correctly completing the task, thus overcoming the linguistic level damaged by the disease. With the experiment presented here I support the idea of a link between the right hemisphere, seats of emotions, and the left one, seats of language, and I demonstrate the power of evaluative morphology as a tool for improving performances in aphasic subjects.

## **What we talk about when we talk about emotions**

Sebastian Löhnner (Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf)

The talk first discusses the grammatical characteristics of Japanese talk about emotions, or more generally, inner states. In English, there is no grammatical difference between statements about one's own inner states and those of third parties: I am happy has the same syntax as she is happy. In Japanese, however, predications about one's own inner states are simpler, lacking an experiencer argument term (just 'Happy.', for example), while predications about third parties' inner states are more complex in that they necessarily embed the predication into an evidential construction. For example, one cannot say 'she's happy', but rather has to say 'the seems to be happy'/'she acts like she's happy' etc. These differences between self-related and other-related inner-state predications are grammatical. They reflect a principal epistemological condition: only the experiencer is in a position to really know about their inner states; other persons can only have indirect evidence for an experiencer's inner state.

This circumstance leads to deep semantic and pragmatic problems:

-The meaning problem:

How can the meaning of expressions for inner states be acquired and conveyed?

-The reference problem:

What do statements by the experiencer about their inner states refer to?

-The evidence problem:

What is the available evidence for making statements about the inner states of others?

What is the epistemic status of such statements?

It will be argued that these problems are overcome in actual communication by the general ability of empathy. In part, empathy is a matter of neurology (cf. mirror neurons and insula findings); but it is also a matter of social culture. The sensitivity of the Japanese language to the epistemological condition of statements about inner states corresponds to a characteristic culture of empathy ('omoiyari') in Japanese society.

### Degree adverb semantics and emotion

Rick Nouwen (Utrecht University)

Why do emotionally charged expressions become adverbs of degree, while emotionally neutral expressions don't have such a use? For instance, the adverbs in (i) can be read as degree intensifiers, while the adverbs in (ii) can only be read as ad-sentential modifiers (yielding a rather strange sentence).

(i) John is f\*\*\*ing / ridiculously / damned tall.

(ii) ?John is usually / normally / typically tall.

In this paper, I will propose that emotive adverbs do not really have a separate degree intensification sense, but that rather the emotive content itself is directly responsible for the intensifying effect. That is, sentences like (i) should be compared to constructions like John is so tall that X, where a similar contrast between emotive and non-emotive results X can be observed: (iii) is fine, but (iv) is strange. In particular (iv) can't mean that John isn't really very stubborn.

(iii) John is so stubborn, { it's ridiculous / it angers me }.

(iv) ?John is so stubborn, { it's normal / it leaves me cold }.

Based on earlier work, I will explain these contrasts in terms of inferences licensed by the lexical semantics of adjectives. Subsequently, I show that such an analysis has profound consequences for how we view expressive emotives like f\*\*\*ing, since we will need to assume that the expressive content of such expressions intrudes into the descriptive domain.

## “So angry” or rather “schon leicht wütend”? -

### A study of language-specific emotion patterns in English and German

Nina-Maria Fronhofer (University of Augsburg)

Emotion concepts in context such as ANGER or HAPPINESS have more recently been viewed from a contrastive perspective (Cislaru 2014; Constantinou 2014; Wierzbicka 2009). The present paper shows that the cognitive (corpus) linguistics framework (Kövecses 2000; Lakoff 1987; Lewandowska-Tomascyk/ Dziwirek 2009) of Emotion Events (Langacker 1987, 1991; Lewandowska-Tomascyk/ Wilson 2010), which are defined as the immediate contextual use of emotion lexemes and their sub-unit parameters such as intensifiers (Fronhofer, accepted) or cognitive verbs (Fetzer 2014), provides a tertium comparationis particularly suitable for revealing cross-linguistic contrasts in the actual use of emotion concepts in discourse. Considering the patterns of emotion lexemes with language-specific sets of sub-unit-parameters, which themselves may function as contextualization cues (Gumperz 1982, 1992ab), language-specific emergent and salient discourse patterns (Ariel 2008) may be disclosed. Qualitative and quantitative analyses of data taken from a comparable, gender-balanced and topic-balanced corpus of elicited personal narratives (n= 248) written by British and German university students corroborate the postulations made above. More specifically, (1) intensifiers co-occurring with emotion lexemes may function as foregrounding/ backgrounding devices, (2) language-specific patterns have been identified, e.g. upgrader + ANGER/ AERGER (97,5%/ 67,7%) vs. downgrader + ANGER/ AERGER (12,5%/ 67,7%):

- |     |    |           |  |
|-----|----|-----------|--|
| (1) | a. | e_f_024_2 | I'm just so happy [...]  |
|     | b. | g_f_012_1 | Ich werde dann fast ein bisschen wütend [...] [nearly a bit angry']  |
| (2) | a. | e_f_033_1 | I'm so annoyed right now [...]   |
|     | b. | g_f_033_2 | [...] bin aber ein wenig irritiert [...] [a bit irritated']  |
|     | c. | e_f_033_2 | [...] some of them were upset, and I think probably a bit jealous,   |
|     |    | g_m_014_2 | Dabei bin ich mir sicher, dass sie [...] jetzt einfach ein wenig neidisch sind. [I am sure ... a bit jealous'] |

In follow-up studies, further emotion concepts (e.g. SURPRISE) as well as discourse patterns will be under scrutiny.

## ANGER IS RED and FEAR IS WHITE: universal conceptual metaphors?

Roxana Ciolăneanu, Alina Villalva, Esperança Cardeira (University of Lisbon)

Starting from the physical evidence that the face usually flushes with rage and whitens with fear and from the general view that people generally conceptualise their emotions in metaphoric terms (Lakoff 1986), in this paper we examine the relationship between emotions and colours, with a focus on ANGER and FEAR. After a short theoretical introduction (Gibbs 1994; Kövecses 1994; Lakoff 1986; Lakoff & Johnson 1999; Elliot & Mayer 2007), we will look at the conception of ANGER and FEAR on the basis of a series of interviews conducted with native speakers of various languages (French, Italian, Portuguese, Romanian, Spanish, Catalan, German, English, Chinese, Japanese, Persian, Russian, Polish, Turkish). We will use non-linguistic criteria, i.e. will base our argument on the classical-medieval theory of the four humours that account for the physiological response of the body to experiencing emotions such as ANGER and FEAR. Consequently, we will argue that the two metaphors are based on a metonymic process that indicates a physiological response: AN INCREASE IN BLOOD FLOW (ANGER) vs. A DECREASE IN BLOOD FLOW (FEAR). The colours associated to the two types of emotions are the carriers of an image content that serves as relation between the investigated emotions and the corresponding physiological reactions. As emotions and physiological responses to them are tightly related to bodily experiences, we will investigate to what extent the metaphors are universal or culture-specific.

## How to describe the indescribable: Charlie Hebdo & Germanwings

Liane Ströbel (Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, RWTH Aachen)

What does it take to describe an emotion? And how can an experience, such as shock, be described? Shock is not really classified as an emotion, due to the fact that it does not display exclusive features, but rather shares its dominant parameters with more prominent emotions, such as e.g. fear. Therefore, it is mostly considered either as something in a grey area, classified as the initial phase of other emotions, or limited to the negative counterpart of surprise.

A contrastive analysis of the linguistic realizations of emotional parameters associated with the experience of shock as well as a corpus analysis of political discourse with regard to recent tragedies, such as Charlie Hebdo and the Germanwings' accident, and their aftermaths dealing with overcoming this state of shock, will illustrate the linguistic and non-linguistic complexity of this particular, "bounded" emotion.

## Two ways of studying emotion metaphors in cognitive linguistics

Zoltán Kövecses, Laura Ambrus, Dániel Hegedűs, Ren Imai, and Anna Sobczak  
(Eötvös-Loránd-University)

There are essentially two major ways of studying emotion metaphors (and metaphors in general) in cognitive linguistics: the older “lexical approach” (e.g., Kövecses, 1986; Lakoff and Kövecses, 1987; Kövecses, 2000) and the more recent “corpus linguistic approach” (e.g., Deignan, 2005; Stefanowitsch, 2006). Proponents of the corpus linguistic approach assert that their method is superior on the grounds that it is free from the weaknesses of the lexical method (it is not intuitive, it is not based on decontextualized language, etc.). In the presentation, we challenge this view by making use of the emotion of surprise as an example. We demonstrate that the two methods of studying emotion metaphors have their own respective strengths and weakness and that they complement each other.

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## Maps

The conference dinner will take place at









Schlösser - Quartier Bohème ([www.quartierboheme.de](http://www.quartierboheme.de))

close to Heinrich-Heine-Allee - Subway Station 



## Train Connections (U79)

### Uni Ost/Botanischer Garten - Heinrich-Heine-Allee Subway Station

Station/Stop	Time	Products
 Uni Ost/Botanischer Garten, Düsseldorf Heinrich-Heine-Allee U, Düsseldorf	dep 17:50 arr 18:04	U
 Uni Ost/Botanischer Garten, Düsseldorf Heinrich-Heine-Allee U, Düsseldorf	dep 18:00 arr 18:14	U
 Uni Ost/Botanischer Garten, Düsseldorf Heinrich-Heine-Allee U, Düsseldorf	dep 18:10 arr 18:24	U
 Uni Ost/Botanischer Garten, Düsseldorf Heinrich-Heine-Allee U, Düsseldorf	dep 18:20 arr 18:34	U
 Uni Ost/Botanischer Garten, Düsseldorf Heinrich-Heine-Allee U, Düsseldorf	dep 18:30 arr 18:44	U
 Uni Ost/Botanischer Garten, Düsseldorf Heinrich-Heine-Allee U, Düsseldorf	dep 18:40 arr 18:54	U
 Uni Ost/Botanischer Garten, Düsseldorf Heinrich-Heine-Allee U, Düsseldorf	dep 18:50 arr 19:04	U
 Uni Ost/Botanischer Garten, Düsseldorf Heinrich-Heine-Allee U, Düsseldorf	dep 19:15 arr 19:29	U



# O.A.S.E. to Mensa



## Mensa to Uni Ost/Botanischer Garten





